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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E. L. ROMNEY. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
COVEY GARAGE, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 6243 
AMERICAN EQUITABLE ASSUR~ 
ANCE COMPANY, a corporation, 
Tr. Page 
Interpleaded Defendant and 
Respondent 
Defendant's Abstract of Record 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff complains of defendant and for 
cause of action alleges: 
1. That defendant is a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah 
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
City; that defendant is, and at all times herein 
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2 
mentioned was, engaged 1n the business of oper-
ating a public garage and accepting cars for 
storage and safekeeping for a consideration. 
2. That on April 30, 1938 the plaintiff was 
the owner of a certain 193'7 Buick sedan auto-
mobile of the reasonable value of $1085.00; that on 
the evening of said date the plaintiff took said 
automobile to the defendant's place of business 
in Salt Lake City and then and there delivered 
said automobile to said defendant and entered 
into a contract with said defendant wherein and 
whereby the defendant, for a consideration re-
ceived by it, agreed to store said automobile an-~ 
use ordinary and reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances then and there existing to safely and 
securely keep said automobile and to return it to 
the plaintiff in the same condition it was in when 
received by said defendant. 
3. That the defendant negligently and care-
lessly failed to safely and securely keep said 
automobile but carelessly and negligently permit-
ted the same to be taken and stolen from said 
garage by Albert Freeman and Brady Wayne 
Poulson without the consent or authority or per-
mission of the plaintiff or anyone acting on his 
behalf. 
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Tr. Page 
2 4. That as the proximate result of said neg-
ligence of the defendant, and while said auto-
mobile was in the possession of said Freeman and 
Poulson it was wrecked and damaged and the 
body, fenders, hood, windows, shock absorbers, 
wheels, tires, steering apparatus, headlights, ra-
diator, engine, doors, bumpers, frame and paint 
were broken, bent, injured, damaged and destroy-
ed to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $800.00, and 
plaintiff was deprived of the use of said car for 
a period of 10 days and the reasonable value 
thereof is $100.00. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment 
against the defendant for the sum of $900.00, to-
gether with costs of court herein incurred. 
BAGLEY, JUDD, RAY & NEBEKER, 
(Duly verified.) 
Filed Nov. 17, 1938. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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4 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
DEMURRER 
Comes now the above named defendant and 
demurs to plaintiff's complaint and alleges: 
1. That said complaint does not state facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
2. That there is a defect of parties plain-
tiff in that plaintiff is not the real party in in-
terest or the person entitled to receive the claim 
sued upon, as plaintiff's insurer by subrogation 
and assignment is a necessary and proper party 
to a complete determination of said cause. 
3. That said complaint is indefinite and un-
certain in the following particulars: 
(a) That it does not appear from said com-
plaint how or in what manner defendant was 
was careless and negligent in permitting plain-
tiff's automobile to be stolen, and the acts of 
negligence, if any, are not set forth so as to ad-
vise defendant of the nature of the negligence 
relied upon by plaintiff. 
(b) That it cannot he ascertained or deter-
mined from paragraph 4 of said complaint the 
nature of the damage to plaintiff's said automobile 
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amounting to the sum of $800.00, that is, whether 
said amount is on account of the cost of repair of 
said automobile or is on account of the difference 
in value of said car prior to and after said acci-
dent, and the nature of said claim is not set 
6 forth in such a manner as to enable defendant to 
defend against the same. 
H-9 
(c) That paragraph 4, and particularly that 
portion thereof relating to damage in the sum of 
$100.00, is indefinite and uncertain in that it does 
not appear therefrom that ten days was the time 
reasonably necessarily required in order to repair 
the damage to said car, nor does it appear that 
plaintiff suffered damage by reason of any de-
privation of use, nor is the reasonable rental 
value of the car set forth in said allegation. 
STEW ART, STEW ART & CARTER, 
C. J. PARKINSON & E. B. CANNON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Filed Dec. 8, 1938. 
Defendant's demurrer was overruled, and 
clefendant was ordered to answer. 
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b 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
ANSWER 
Comes now the defendant and for its answer 
to plaintiff's complaint admits, denies and alleges 
as follows: 
1. Answering paragraph 1 defendant admits 
that it is a corporation as in said paragraph al-
leged and at the times mentioned in said com-
plaint was operating a public garage in Salt Lake 
City. 
2. Answering paragraph 2 defendant ad-
mits that plaintiff was the owner of a certain 
Buick automobile which was left by plaintiff in 
defendant's garage for storage on or about the 
30th day of April, 1938, and for the ordinary and 
usual care of which automobile defendant was 
responsible. 
3. Answering paragraph :; defendant admits 
that said automobile was stolen from defendant's 
garage but denies that defendant carelessly and 
negligently permitted said automobile to be stolen 
as in said paragraph alleged. 
4. Answering paragraph 4 defendant denies 
that said automobile was in the possession of 
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Freeman and Poulson as a result of any negli-
gence on the part of defendant, but admits and 
alleges that said automobile was stolen and dam-
aged, but denies that plaintiff was damaged to 
the extent and in the amount alleged in said 
paragraph. 
11 3. Denies generally and specifically each and 
every material allegation in plaintiff's complaint 
contained except as heretofore or hereafter ad-
mitted, denied or qualified. 
6. Further answering said complaint, and 
as a first separate and affirmative defense thereto, 
defendant alleges that plaintiff is not the real 
party in interest in this proceeding and has not 
legal capacity to sue on account of the claim set 
forth in his complaint. 
7. Further answering said complaint defend-
ant alleges the fact to be that on the 30th day 
of April, 1938, plaintiff carried a policy of in-
surance with American Equitable Assurance Com-
pany whereby his said Buick sedan automobile 
was insured against loss by collision and theft, 
and after the theft and wrecking of said automo-
bile plaintiff's said named insurance company 
paid to plai:q.tiff the reasonable, fair and proper 
damage to said automobile and under and by 
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virtue of the terms of: said policy and an agree-
ment of subrogation duly executed by plaintiff 
said insurance company became the owner of all 
claims for damages against defendant herein and 
the cause of action herein sued upon became the 
property of said insurance company, and plain-
tiff herein is not the owner of such claim or en-
titled to sue the defendant on account thereof. 
That said insurance company has heretofore as-
serted its claim against defendant and has advised 
defendant of its rights to recover the damage so 
suffered to said automobile and defendant is ad-
vised and informed and therefore alleges that said 
insurance company has asserted, or may hereafter 
assert, a claim against defendant for the same 
damages alleged by plaintiff to have been suffer-
ed by him. That said insurance company is a 
necessary and proper party to a complete deter-
mination of all claims on account of the damage 
to said automobile and said company should be 
made a party to this action either as plaintiff 
or defendant. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that an or-
der of this court be made and entered herein 
making American Equitable Assurance Company 
12 a party to this action and requiring said com-
pany to appear herein either as plaintiff or as a 
defendant in order that all rights and claims may 
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be fully determined in this action. Defend~nt 
further prays that Plaintiff take nothing by rea-
son of his complaint herein; that the same be dis-
missed and that defendant have and recover its 
costs incurred in this proceeding. 
STEWART, STEWART & CARTER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
(Duly verified.) 
Filed Jan. 13, 1939. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
ORDER 
Upon filing the verified answer of Covey 
Garage, a corporation, and application of said 
defendant, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that American 
Equitable Assurance Company, a corporation, be, 
and it is hereby, interpleaded herein as a defend-
ant and ordered to appear and set forth its rights 
and claims, if any, against the defendant, Covey 
Garage, and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
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a copy of defendant's ·answer and summons be 
served upon said interpleaded defendant. 
Dated this 13th day of January, 1939. 
ALLEN G. THURMAN 
judge 
Filed January 13, 1939. 
15 Said order, together with a copy of defend-
ant's answer, was served upon the interpleaded 
defendant, American Equitable Assurance Com-
pany, a corporation, by showing the original order 
and delivering a copy of said order to C. Clarence 
N eslen, commissioner of insurance, its process 
agent, together with a copy of defendant's answer. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS 
34 BE IT REMEMBERED that on April19, 1939, 
the above-entitled cause came on regularly for 
trial before Hon. P. C. Evans, Judge, sitting with· 
out a jury, the respective parties being repre· 
sen ted by counsel, as follows: 
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For the Plaintiff: A. H. Nebeker, Esq. 
For the Defendant: Ralph T. Stewart, Esq. 
The parties announced that they were ready 
for trial, and thereupon the following proceedings 
were had: 
It was stipulated that in the event it should 
be decided that plaintiff is entitled to recover 
that the damages to be recovered are $'715.00, 1n 
addition to the usual taxable costs of court. 
3j It was stipulated that the American Equit-
. able Assurance Company paid to Mr. Romney, 
the plaintiff, under a collision coverage policy, 
the amount of his loss under the policy, subject 
to the objection of Mr. Nebeker on the grounds of 
the immateriality of such stipulation. 
37 MR. STEW ART: * ~·: * At this time I ob-
ject to the introduction of any evidence for the 
reason and upon the grounds that the. complaint 
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action; for the further reason that the 
complaint affirmatively shows on its face that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, because 
it alleges no negligence on the part of the defend-
ant and because further it affirmatively alleges 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Tr. Page 
that the automobile was stolen from the defend-
38 ants which automatically releases the defendants 
from liability. Allegation of theft shifts the bur-
den of proof to the plaintiff to both allege and 
prove negligence, and in this case there is no 
allegation of negligence, except the conclusion that 
the defendant negligently permitted the car to be 
stolen. 
MR. STEWART: I want the record to clear· 
ly show at this time that we are prepared to 
defend at this time on the basis of the plead-
ings as they now stand, and not on the basis of 
any testimony that might be admitted which we 
contend is not admissible under the pleadings. 
THE COURT: Your objection may be over-
ruled. You may proceed. 
35 C. B. SQUIRES, a witness produced on he-
half of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows: 
38 My name is C. B. Squires and I am a resident 
of Ogden, Utah. 
39 Q. Calling your attention to the latter part 
of February, 1938, did you, on or about the 26th 
day of February of that year, deliver your car 
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to the Covey Garage in Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
storage? 
A. I did. 
MR. STEW ART: Just a moment. I object 
to that as irrelevant and immaterial, and the wit-
ness having answered before my objection was 
made, I move to strike the answer. 
THE COURT: The answer may be stricken 
merely for the purpose of permitting you to make 
your objection. 
MR. STEW ART: If your honor please, I 
understand that the plaintiff proposes to prove 
that some two or three months prior to the time 
that this particular theft is alleged, that Mr. 
Squires left his car at the garage and that it was 
not there, or he didn't get it when he came back for 
it, or possibly that it was stolen, and it is my 
position that such testimony is irrelevant and 
immaterial; that it would raise a wholly collat-
eral issue that would have to be separately tried 
to determine whether or not in the Squires par-
ticular case that car was stolen under certain 
circumstances which might be negligent, and that 
such issue would be so collateral and immaterial 
as to inject into the case a matter entirely irrele-
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vant, and if your honor wishes to take the time at 
present moment, I will be glad to discuss that 
question of law. 
40 THE COURT: I am not aware of what the 
purpose is; I am not adivsed as to the purpose 
here. It is not at all apparent. 
MR. NEBEKER: I think it is more orderly 
to ask the questions. 
MR. STEWART: Well, I make my objec-
tion at this time to any testimony of this witness 
relative to a possible previous theft from the de-
fendant garage, any such evidence being wholly 
irrelevant and immaterial and being an attempt 
to raise a wholly collateral issue that would have 
to be fully tried in order to determine whether 
or not it might possibly have any bearing upon 
this present case. 
THE COURT: The objection may be over-
ruled. If it is not material, it will be disregarded. 
MR. STEWART: So that I may not renew 
my objection to each and every question that is 
asked, may it he stipulated and the court order 
that that ohjeGtion go to each separate question 
asked by counsel? 
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:\1 R. ~EBEKER: Yes. 
A. On or about February 26, 1938, at about 
6:30 or seven o'clock P.M. I delivered by automo-
bile to the Covey Garage in Salt Lake City for 
storage and received a claim check. I returned to 
41 claim the car Sunday. February 27th about ten 
A. M., presented my claim check to the attend-
ant, who did not deliver the car to me. 
Q. What was done in your presence there 
with respect to attempting to locate your car? 
:MR. STEWART: I particularly object to 
any such testimony on the grounds already stated 
and for the further reason that it could have no 
bearing upon the present case. 
THE COURT: Well, of course, it is not ap-
parent yet. However, the objection may be over-
ruled. 
A. When I presented the claim check I told 
him the kind of car and the color. 
MR. STEWART: We object to that as being 
hearsay and there being no foundation as to whom 
he told, or whether he told it to anybody that 
would make any such statement binding upon the 
defendant. 
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MR. NEBEKER: Be is talking to the at. 
tendant at the garage. 
A. And the man in charge, I told him that 
MR. STEW ART: Then I make the furthe1 
objection that anything that might have beer 
said or done by an attendant in charge would no1 
be binding upon the defendant. 
THE COURT: If it is in the nature of all 
admission, of course-
MR. NEBEKER: No; it won't be in the na· 
ture of an admission. 
42 THE COURT: The objection will be over· 
ruled. 
Q. You may state what was done. 
A. This man in charge took me all througl 
the garage in an effort to locate my car, and the1 
he told me I couldn't claim it. 
MR. STEWART: Just a moment. I objec 
to anything he may have told him while takin1 
him through the garage as not in any way bind 
ing, or there being no foundation to make tha 
binding upon the defendant corporation. 
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THE COU~T: * * * The objection will be 
overruled. 
Q. You may answer the question-continue 
with your answer. 
A. (Answer read) I will have to correct 
that. I looked through the garage and the ·car 
couldn't be located. Then he told me the car had 
been stolen and referred me to the manager of 
the garage, and told me then that the car had 
been driven out. 
MR. STEWART: Just a minute. Are you 
43 talking about the same conversation? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. STEWART: With the same attendant? 
A. Same attendant and the manager, that 
the car had been driven out-
MR. STEWART: I take it that my objection 
goes to all of this? 
MR. NEBEKER: Yes. 
A. The night before about 11 :50 and that it 
had not been located; that they didn't know 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tr. Page 
44 
18 
where it was; that they had reported it to the 
Police Department of Salt Lake City. My car 
was thereafter recovered. It was not damaged from 
appearances but mechanically. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
I don't know myself, except from such state-
ments of the employees, how my car was stolen, 
or how the thieves got into the garage, or any-
thing of that nature. 
MR. STEWART: Now, at this time, your 
honor, we move to strike all of the testimony of 
Mr. Squires concerning an alleged taking of his 
car on the ground that such testimony is wholly 
irrelevant and immaterial, and purports to raise 
a wholly collateral, does in fact raise a wholly 
collateral matter, that the testimony does not show 
any, or disclose any facts as to an occurrence due 
to any negligence; it does not show a condition, 
which the defendant might or should have reme-
died in any way; it does not indicate any course 
of conduct, or a neglect to remedy any condition, 
or any negligence of any employee which would 
have any bearing or relationship to a subsequent 
theft of an automobile. It is unlike the case that 
counsel referred to where the testimony of prior 
occurrences in the mind indicated a negligent con-
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clition or a condition that was likely in the future 
to cause an accident. 
THE COURT: The motion may be denied. 
45 E. L. ROMNEY, the plaintiff herein, pro-
duced as a witness on his own behalf, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
I am the plaintiff in this action and reside in 
Logan, Utah. I delivered my car to the Covey 
Garage in Salt Lake for storage between ten 
and eleven o'clock in the evening on April 30, 
1938. If you know exactly the time that the owl 
got in the wires and turned off part of the city 
46 lights, it was probably forty-five minutes after 
the lights came back on. I had taken my car 
there for storage many times on prior occasions. 
I got a claim check when I delivered the car and 
my best recollection is that plaintiff's Exhibit 
"B" is such claim check. I told them to fill it with 
gasoline. I left the car right in front of the north 
part of the entrance of the garage where the 
47 ·office was. I would say plaintiff's Exhibit "A" 
fairly represents the physical lay-out of the Covey 
Garage in Salt Lake City. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and "B" were of-
fered and received in evidence. 
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48 I left my keys in the car on this occasion and 
on all prior occasions when I parked my car 
there. It was the practice of the garage to have its 
own attendants park my car, drive it into the 
garage and place it in a certain position, and 
also when I returned to get my car, to bring it 
out. During all the time that I had parked my 
car there, I had on no occasion taken my car 
in myself and taken the keys out. It was a Sat-
urday evening that I left my car there. The 
pedestrian traffic on the sidewalk in front of the 
garage at the time I delivered my car there was 
49 heavy. A number of people were parking cars 
in the garage and going to the dance; young 
ladies with party dresses on. After I left my car 
at the garage, I went to the Newhouse Hotel. 
About two A. M. Sunday the phone rang. It was 
someone from police headquarters. I got dressed 
50 and went over io the garage. 
51 It was admitted by the defendant that the 
automobile was stolen and that the bailment was 
for hire. 
MR. STEWART: I move at this time to 
strike all of the testimony of this witness on the 
ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and im-
material and not within any issue properly raised 
by the pleadings. The pleadings affirmatively 
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21 
show that the car was stolen and this testimony 
in no way tends to establish any liability on the 
part of the defendant. 
THE COURT: The motion may be denied. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
I know garages storing automobiles usually 
tell you to leave the keys in the car, no matter 
what garage you go to. Whether I parked my 
car in the Covey Garage or elsewhere in the state 
or out of the state, they always had me leave 
my keys in the car, although I have put my car 
in some garages that I insisted taking my keys 
with me because I didn't have faith in the garage. 
53 I have been acquainted with the Covey Garage 
for many years. I had a very fine hello acquaint-
ance with every one of the boys working at the 
garage-a fine bunch of chaps. For several years 
54 I have stored my car there many times at the 
garage. They have always given me a check stub 
similar to the one I received on this occasion. 
55 STEEL REMINGTON, a witness produced 
on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
I was working at the Covey Garage on the 
30th of April, 1938. I recall the occasion the eve-
ning of April 30, 1938, and the circumstances 
surrounding the removal from the garage of Mr. 
Romney's car. I went on duty at one o'clock in 
the afternoon. I was not the attendant who re-
ceived Mr. Romney's car when he took it in, but 
I saw it at the time it went into the garage. It 
56 was then between ten and eleven o'clock. Ken-
neth Jones, Ben Baxter, and myself were on duty 
at that time. 
MR. STEWART: So there won't be any mis-
take in the record, I want it understood that my 
objection goes to all of this testimony, particularly 
for the reason that there is no allegation of neg-
ligence and particularly for the reason that the 
complaint affirmatively shows that plaintiff is 
not entitled to recover, and any testimony of this 
nature would be irrelevant and immaterial. 
THE COURT: The objection may be over-
ruled. 
Our duties were taking and receiving and de-
livering cars and we also have the duties of serv-
57 icing, such as gas and oil. In connection with the 
storage garage, we have a gasoline and oil busi-
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ness and also an automobile laundry, hut the 
laundry closes at six o'clock. The garage itself 
never closes. It is open day and night. We were not 
Yery busy between ten and eleven-thirty P. M. on 
~"\.pril 30th. Referring to plaintiff's Exhibit "A", 
there are only two doors opening from the service 
platform in front of the garage into the storage 
portion of the garage. The opening appearing to 
the left of these two openings (looking at the 
picture) is the wash rack, hut there are usually 
cars parked on it and it is not so anybody can 
get out of it with an automobile without moving 
some others. I don't recall just how the wash rack 
was on the evening of April 30th, hut we usually 
put two beer trucks on that wash rack every night. 
58 There are doors that close in front of the wash 
rack. I don't know whether these doors were closed 
between ten and eleven-thirty on the evening of 
April 30, 1938, nor do I know whether anything 
'"'as parked on the wash rack. Our practice is to 
drive cars coming into the garage in the north 
entrance and out the south entrance. The garage 
faces east, so the north entrance or the one we 
usually drove the cars in would appear on the 
right hand side of the picture looking at the pic-
hue. I testified about these events I am talking 
about and was called as a witness in the case 
59 of State vs. Bud Freeman. Whenever there is 
anybody going in the garage, we usually stop 
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them and ask what they want. We usually watch 
for them. I don't recall anybody particularly that 
went in between ten and eleven-thirty on this 
evening. It is our practice to not let them go in 
the garage without knowing where they are going 
unless we know the person. If we don't know 
the person we prevent them from going in. Oc-
casionally someone starts in and we keep them 
from going in. I am familiar with the storage 
60 portion of the garage itself. Other than the en-
trances that are shown in this picture, Exhibit 
"A", there is a back door on the north side of 
the garage about three quarters of the way back. 
It was closed and locked between ten and eleven. 
The man who takes care of the mail trucks does 
that and we usually check him. I don't recall 
whether or not I checked it on the evening of 
April 30th. It is the duty of one of us to do it 
some time in the evening, but this is not assigned 
to any particular man. Except this back door I 
have mentioned, I don't know of any other en-
trance into the garage, except an entrance that 
goes through the garage and comes out on Fifth 
61 South, but that place is always locked up. Be-
tween this door and Fifth South, there is busi-
ness in there. The door between the garage and 
this other place of business is always padlocked. 
I didn't check this door on the night of April 30th, 
but it stands to reason that it is alwavs locked. 
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62 \Yhen the car belonging to ~lr. Romney was 
driven out of the garage, I was standing over by 
the little office on the north side of the drive" 
either inside or standing right in the door. It was 
right close there. Kenneth Jones and Ben Baxter 
were with me. I don't remember just what posi· 
tion any of us were in. 'Ve were all standing there 
together talking. That is the little office that is 
shown on the right hand side of the picture west 
of the two gasoline pumps. All of that office is 
made of glass except the north side and that is 
the wall. I observed Mr. Romney's car as it was 
driven out of the garag·e. Two people were in t~e 
63 front seat. I had not seen these two people or any 
other people while I was there that evening go 
into the garage. That evening there were about 
seventy-five cars stored on the lower floor of 
the garage. That pretty well fills the lower floor 
up. We usually put all our regular storage up on 
the top floor. There were about forty cars up there. 
It is our practice with all cars that are parkerl 
on the lower floor to ask the customer who stores 
the car to leave his keys in the car. Unless it 
is requested from the owner we leave the keys in 
64 all the cars, except dead storage that is in there 
for a month or so. It is the custom for the attend-
ants to drive the cars in and park them them-
selves, and then go and get them and bring them 
ont. On the evening of April 30th, I don't recall 
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that any cars were standing on what we call the 
service platform, just east of the front doors of 
the garage. There was a line of cars down on 
the south side. That is not at the entrance to 
the wash rack, but to the south of the wash rack. 
These cars would be just south of the runway 
into the wash rack. Between ten and eleven-
65 thirty P. M. on April 30th, there were about four 
cars there, with their noses pointing to the south. 
The wash rack was usually closed for the appear-
ance of the garage. Mr. Jones, Mr. Baxter and 
myself all had the same duties of selling gas 
66 and oil and parking and delivering cars. Mr. 
Jones came on duty about the same time I did 
and Mr. Baxter came on duty at ten o'clock P. M. 
CROSS EXAMJNATTO\I 
With respect to the handling of the cars for 
people attending the dance at the Coconut Grove, 
the crowd brings the majority or the largest 
number of cars for storage to the g·arage be-
tween 8:30 and 1.0.30, and then they start coming 
to get their cars in leaving the dance about twelve 
67 o'clock, unless it is a big holiday. On this par-
ticular night, it was very quiet and we were not 
busy between about ten-thirty and twelve o'clock. 
There were three of us on duty when this rnr 
was taken out. which wa.; between elcYcn and 
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eleven-thirty P. M. The office is outside of the 
closing doors and about right in the center of 
the canopy between the sidewalk and the doors. 
It is not any part of the building that closes up, 
68 and from that office, which is glass on three sides, 
you have a clear view of the entire front of the 
garage and can see any corner of the whole 
garage. The doorway that is at the right side 
(looking at the picture) next to the office is the 
door where cars drive in and the other door, 
which is about one-third of the way from the 
left side of the picture, is the exit door, and 
the entrance or opening, not at the extreme left 
of the picture, but nearly to the left side is the 
wash rack, where I stated that at night we usually 
parked two beer trucks inside. The opening that 
appears to be an entrance at the extreme left 
edge of the picture is just a little sort of room 
that has a door in the back that is always kept 
locked and no one ever goes in it and it is not used 
69 as an exit or entrance. When this car was driven 
out, it was driven out the south or regular exit. 
In looking at the picture it is the one that is 
below the greasing sign. The rear entrance that 
is about two-thirds of the way towards the back 
of the garage on the north side, which I men-
tioned to Mr. Nebeker, is the entrance that the 
government uses to take its mail trucks in at 
T1ight. The government employee usually takes 
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those trucks in between seven and ten. The last 
truck as a rule gets in at ten. The man who takes 
care of them has a key to that door, and he drives 
?0 them in. He takes them from the outside and 
drives them through the door in~o the garage 
and then he comes right back and gets another 
one. We met cars that came into the front of 
the garage under the canopy usually right by the 
office or near the office and it is under the can-
opy that we give them their clairr1 check and take 
possession of the cars and then when they came 
back with their claim check, one of us would go 
and get the car for them. At the time the car 
was driven out, myself and the other two em-
ployees were there at the front of the garage. 
When I first saw it, it was about ten feet on 
the inside of the south entrn nee. It hadn't even 
71 emerged from the entranc ~ when I first saw it 
moving. There wasn't n~uch that we could rlo 
until they got clear oui: on the service entrance 
platform. Then I went to my car and went in 
pursuit of the Romney car. As the Romney car 
came out I observed it almost instantly, and 
even before it got through the door. At no time 
within an hour prior to the taking of this car had 
I observed anybody enter the front of the garage 
at all. With respect to letting people ·in the garage. 
we had been instructed to find out where they 
72 were going and why, and 'in the event we should 
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permit them to go in and we didn't know them, we 
usually went with them. The lavatory at this 
time was just inside the north entrance. It had 
been moved from the rear of the garage to the 
front of the garage, just inside the door, so that 
people would not have any occasion to go to the 
rear of the garage. I haven't the slightest idea how 
Freeman and whoever ''las with him got inside 
of the garage that night. We have all been won-
dering and speculating as to how he got in. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
The dark space that appears at the extreme 
left hand side of the picture as you face the 
picture is an entrance, but it is never used. It 
is kept locked all the time, but it has doors. See 
it is open here as shown in the picture, but it 
has sliding doors. At the time this picture was 
taken they were not shut. The picture shows them 
open. On dance nights, particularly, it is cus-
:-.t. tomary for a number of people to use the rest 
room at the garage. A lot of them who have no 
cars to park go in there and use the rest room. 
They don't come to us and ask if they can use 
the rest room, but we see where they are going 
before they go in there. We usually watched them 
to see where they went and watched them to 
see that they came back out. We observed in a 
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general way as permitted by the other duties 
'75 we had to do. The rest room is about ten feet 
inside the door. 
The man I said who has a key to the door 
on the north side of the garage that takes the 
government cars in is an employee of the gov-
ernment. I don't remember just what his name 
is. We used to call him Slim all the time. These 
mail trucks are left by the drivers on the out-
76 side of the garage in the evening. Slim is not one 
of their drivers. He is a mechanic. He worked 
on the government cars in the evening in that 
part of the same building reserved for their trucks. 
I believe it was Ben Baxter that parked Mr. 
Romney's car on the evening of the 30th. I 
wouldn't say for sure. It was parked directly 
back or directly down the ramp from the south 
door facing east. It was about a hundred feet 
from the door to the car as parked. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
77 The front part of the garage is about the 
street level. When you get toward the back end 
of the garage, you drop about four feet 
on a ramp to a lower floor. The car was parked 
on the west side of the lower floor at the west 
wall. 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
'V e had a key to the door on the north side 
of the garage in addition to Slim, that is, the 
station has a key to it. This key is kept on the 
register. The people who rented that part of 
the building that faces on Fifth South had a key 
to the door that communicates between the gar-
age proper and the sales floor that faces on Fifth 
7H South. If someone had a key, he could not come 
through from that portion of the building that 
faces on Fifth South into the garage proper, as 
he would come to a partition and the door is pad-
locked from the garage or the storage side. The 
padlock is on the inside of the Covey Garage. 
KENNETH JONES ·was produced as a wit-
ness on behalf of plaintiff and was duly sworn. 
80 It was stipulated that said witness would 
S 1 testify substantially the same as the witness 
Steel Remington. That he did not see the boys go 
into the garage, but that they all saw Freeman 
bringing it out, just about the time it came through 
the door before it got on the front platform. 
MR. NEBEKER: With that T will not cal1 
the witness, and plaintiff rests. 
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MR. STEWART: At this time, if your 
honor please, I renew my objections heretofore 
made to the introduction of any evidence relating 
or that might have a tendency to relate to any 
question of negligence. And particularly I move 
to strike the testimony of Mr. Squires on the 
ground that it is entirely irrelevant and imma-
terial and raises a wholly collateral issue, there 
not being any evidence that would show a simi-
larity of facts establishing a similarity of theft to 
that in this particular instance. 
I move to strike all of the testimony of the 
witnesses Remington and Jones on the ground that 
it is not within any issues in the case, that it is 
not within any allegations of negligence and the 
complaint itself precludes the introduction of any 
evidence of negligence. 
And at this time, if your honor please, I also 
move for a dismissal of this case, 
First, for the reason that the complaint does 
not state a cause of action; 
82 Second: For the reason that the complaint 
excuses a failure of delivery of the car by the 
defendant to the plaintiff because the plaintiff 
affirmatively alleges that the car was stolen, and 
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does not allege any acts of negligence on the part 
of the defendant in permitting it to be so neg-
ligently stolen; 
Also for the reason that there is no evidence 
of negligence, that is, assuming such negligence 
was pleaded on the part of the defendant, there 
being no showing that the defendant conducted 
or operated its garage in any manner other than 
the ordinary and usual manner of conducting 
garages in this particular part of the country, par-
ticularly in the vicinity of Salt Lake City, where 
garages are kept open for day and night storage. 
18 Defendant's motion for non-suit and dismis-
sal was argued and submitted and taken under 
advisement by the court, and the further trial of 
the case continued without date. 
19-;\ Defendant's motion for a non-suit and dis-
missal was denied June 15,1939. 
81 (Monday, Oct. 9, 1939, 10 A. M. Court Re-
convened.) 
MR. STEW ART: Your honor, so there will 
be no question about my record, I want to have 
the reporter note an exception to th~ court's denial 
of the motion for dismissal. 
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PAT ROZELL, a witness produced on behalf 
of the defendant. being first duly sworn, testified 
as follows: 
I am thirty-one years of age and have been 
1n the garage business approximately twelve 
years, and I am still operating in such business. 
My father has been operating in the business 
much longer than that, and I have worked with 
him since I was twenty years old. During that 
time I have managed or served as assistant mana-
ger at the Auto Ramp Garage, the Cullen Garage, 
and the North Temple Garage in Salt Lake City, 
and at one time, a garage in Pocatello, Idaho, 
so that during the twelve years I have been in 
85 the garage business, I have managed some three 
or four or more garages and during the past 
twelve years, I have also had occasion to visit 
numerous garages throughout the country. I am 
familiar, particularly in Salt Lake, and in the 
State of Utah, with the manner in which garages 
are operated, particularly those garages which 
cater to live storage, transient storage business 
and remain open both day and night. At the 
present time, I am manager of the Cullen Garage, 
which remains open day and night. I know what 
the practice is with respect to the garages that I 
am familiar with, and the way substantially all 
of the garages in this territory operate in the 
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matter of having the keys remain in the automo-
bile stored. The practice is that the customer leaves 
the keys in the car when he leaves it there. Unless 
86 the customer insists that his car be locked, we 
would rather have them leave the keys in the 
car so that it can be moved, or in case of a fire 
or something, or some emergency that may come 
up, we want to move the car in a hurry, it is 
ready to go, and also for the purpose of facilitating 
the servicing of cars, checking tires, gas and 
matters of that kind. That is generally the prac-
tice, not only in this city, but every place I have 
been. With respect to the maintenance of em-
87 ployees at the garage, it is practically impos-
sible to keep an attendant at the entrance at all 
times. There are things that come up and busi-
ness to be taken care of that would take the 
employees away from the entrance. 
It was stipulated that in the operation of 
garages such as the one here in question, that 
cater particularly to live storage and transient 
storage business, that ordinarily sufficient em-
ployees. both day and night, are maintained to 
handle the ordinary run of business by meeting 
the cars coming in at the front entrance, taking 
those cars back into the garage, parking them 
nnd coming back and meeting other cars that 
nre arriving, and similarly when persons come 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
T1· Page 
for their cars to the garage, to take the claim 
88 check, if it is a claim check storage, and go and 
get the car and bring it to the front of the garage 
and turn it over to the customer, subject to 
plaintiff's objection that such a stipulation was 
immaterial and irrelevant. 
It was further stipulated that garage at-
89 tendants of garages similarly situated, during the 
times when they are not busy handling cars, also 
attend to filling up gas tanks, greasing cars that 
the customers want to have greased and perform 
those ordinary duties in such a garage, particu-
larly garages that do servicing in the way of oil-
ing and greasing and cleaning and so on. 
91 It was stipulated that on the night that 
plaintiff's car was stolen and at the hour of 9:19 
p. m. all of the lights in the city, including inside 
residence and business lights, as well as street 
lights, were out for a period of approximately 
five minutes, and that they first went out at 
9:19p.m. 
It was stipulated that the car was brought 
92 to the garage perhaps half or three-quarters of 
an hour after the lights were off. 
It was stipulated that as soon as the car 
was driven out of the garage, that one of the 
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three employees of the garage immediately got 
into his car, took after the Romney car and chased 
it for some twenty or so blocks all up through the 
east part of town. and then back down some-
where near where the car was finally appre-
hended, or where the collision occurred between 
the Romney car driven by Freeman and another 
car, resulting in the crash. 
93 THERON COVEY, a witness produced on 
94 
behalf of the defendant, being first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
At the time of the theft I was manager and 
part owner of the Covey Garage. At the time the 
Romney car was stolen, there was a large sig~ 
inside of the garage at or near the north entrance 
stating that the garage was not responsible for 
loss by fire and theft. 
Defendant rested. 
96 That at the conclusion of all of the evidence, 
and on the 9th day of October, 1939, said cause 
was orally argued to the court, who took the same 
under advisement until the 14th day of November, 
1939, when a decision was entered in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant. That there-
after plaintiff made application to amend the 
prayer of his complaint to ask for the allowance 
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of interest. That defendant appeared, through his 
counsel, and made objection to such proposed 
amendment, which objection was denied and the 
amendment allowed. That thereafter plaintiff 
served and presented proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment to which pro-
posals written objections were duly filed by de-
fendant and defendant served and presented to 
the court proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. That thereafter and on the 29th 
day of December, 1939, the defendant's objections 
to said proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law were duly argued and presented to the 
court and defendant's proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law were duly presented and 
on the 29th day of December, 1939, the court 
overruled and denied the objections of the defend-
ant and refused to sign and file defendant's pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
and on the 29th day of December, 1939, signed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment. 
30 Thereafter and within the time allowed by 
law, and on the 30th day of December, 1939, an 
order was duly made and entered herein granting 
to the defendant to and including the 1st day of 
March, 1940, in which to prepare, serve, and file 
its bill of exceptions herein. 
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CERTIFICATE OF THE COURT 
1 ss. 
COeNTY OF SALT LAKE J 
I, the undersigned, P. C. Evans, the judge 
before whom the above entitled cause was tried, 
do hereby certify that the foregoing Bill of Ex-
ceptions, consisting of pages 1 to 66 inclusive, 
contains all of the evidence, both oral and doc-
umentary, offered and received in said cause, in-
cluding all exhibits, which said exhibits and docu-
mentary evidence when not attached or contained 
in the transcript of evidence are treated and con-
sidered as attached and a part of the Bill of Ex-
ceptions, and said proposed Bill of Exceptions 
contains all objections made, rulings of the Court, 
and exceptions taken and all proceedings in the 
trial of said cause, and the parties having stipu-
lated that the same may be settled and filed as 
the defendant's bill of exceptions herein; 
99 NOW, THEREFORE, the same is hereby 
settled, allowed, and approved as and for the 
bill of exceptions in the above entitled cause 
insofar as the same do not _otherwise appear in the 
judgment roll or on record. 
Dated this 29th day of February, 1940. 
P. C. EVANS 
judge 
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23 (Title of Court and Cause) 
ORDER 
On motion of Bagley, Judd, Ray & Nebeker, 
and good cause appearing therefore, 
It is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiff 
may amend the prayer of his complaint to read 
as follows: 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment 
against the defendant for the sum of 
$900.00, together with costs of court 
herein incurred and together with in-
terest at the rate of 6% from April 
30, 1938 to the date of judgment. 
Dated this 1st day of December, 1939. 
P. C. EVANS, 
judge 
Receipt of a copy of the foregoing order 
acknowledged this 29th day of November, 1939 
and hereby consent that plaintiff's motion to 
amend the prayer of his complaint may be heard 
by the court and ruled upon without notice. 
STEWART, STEWART & PARKINSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
COVEY GARAGE. 
Filed Dec. 1, 1939. 
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(Title of Court and Cause) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The above entitled action came on for trial 
before this court on April 19, 1939 and on October 
9, 1939. The plaintiff. E. L. Romney, ·was repre-
sented by A. H. Nebeker of Bagley, Judd, Ray 
and Nebeker, and the defendant, Covey Garage, 
was represented by Ralph T. Stweart of Stewart, 
Stewart and Carter. The plaintiff \introduced 
evidence in support of his complaint and the de-
fendant introduced evidence in support of its an-
swer and both parties rested. The cause being 
submitted and the court being fully advised now 
makes and enters the following findings of fact 
and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant, Covey Garage, 1s a cor-
poration organized and existing under the laws of 
the State of Utah with its principal place of busi-
ness in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is and at all times 
herein mentioned was engaged in the business of 
operating a public garage and accepting cars for 
storage and safekeeping for a consideration. 
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2. That on April 30, 1938 the plaintiff was 
the owner of a certain Buick automobile; that he-
tween 10 and 11 o'clock P. M. the plaintiff took 
said automobile to the defendant's garage in Salt 
Lake City and delivered said automobile to said 
defendant and entered into a contract of storage 
and bailment with said defendant and the defend-
25 ant agreed for a valuable consideration received 
by it, to store said automobile and use reasonable 
care to safely and securely keep said automobile 
and to return it to the plaintiff in the same condi-
tion it was in when received by said defendant. 
3. That the defendant negligently and care-
lessly failed to safely and securely keep said 
automobile and carelessly and negligently per-
mitted said car to be taken and stolen from said 
garage by Albert Freeman and Brady Wayne 
Poulsen without the consent or authority or per-
mission of the plaintiff. 
4. That as the proximate result of the neg-
ligence of the defendant and while said automo-
bile was in the possession of Freeman and Poulsen 
it was wrecked and damaged and the plaintiff 
sustained loss resulting therefrom in the sum of 
$715.00 together with interest thereon as provided 
by law. 
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5. That the plaintiff is the real party in in~ 
terest in this proceeding and has legal capacity 
to sue on account of the claim alleged in his 
complaint. 
6. That American Equitable Assurance Com-
pany has no claim against Covey Garage result-
ing from the damage to said automobile. 
From the foregoing findings of fact the court 
makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
against the defendant for $715.00 together with 
interest thereon at 6% per annum from April 30, 
1938 to the date of judgment and together with 
his costs of court herein expended. 
2. That said judgment provide that the Amer-
ican Equitable Assurance Company has no 
claim against Covey Garage on account of the 
damage to plaintiff's automobile. 
Dated December 29, 1939. 
P.C.EVANS 
judge 
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26 (Title of Court and Cause) 
JUDGMENT 
The above entitled cause came on for trial 
before this court on April 19, 1939 and on October 
9, 1939. The plaintiff E. L. Romney was repre-
sented by A. H. Nebeker of Bagley, Judd, Ray 
and Nebeker, and the defendant Covey Garage 
was represented by Ralph T. Stewart of Stewart, 
Stewart and Carter. The plaintiff having intro-
duced evidence in support of his complaint and 
the defendant having introduced evidence in sup-
port of its answer and both parties having rested 
and the court having heretofore made and en-
tered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff, 
E. L. Romney, have and recover from the defend-
ant, Covey Garage, the sum of $715.00 together 
with interest thereon at 6% per annum from April 
30, 1938 to December 29, 1939 in the sum of $71.35 
and together with costs of court herein expended. 
That the American Equitable Assurance Com-
pany take nothing from the defendant, Covey 
Garage. 
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Dated this 29th day of December, 1939. 
Filed Dec. 29. 1939. 
P. C. EVANS 
judge 
99 Within the time allowed by law and the 
31 
order of the court, defendanfs bill of exceptions, 
containing all of the evidence both oral and docu-
mentary and proceedings in the trial was duly 
settled. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED AND TO AMERI-
ICAN EQUITABLE ASSURANCE COMPANY, A 
CORPORATION, AND JUDD, RAY, QUINNEY, & 
NEBEKER, THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE 
T A K E N 0 T I C E that Covey Garage, a corpora-
tion, defendant herein, hereby appeals to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, from the de-
cision of the court and judgment entered thereon 
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46 
on the 29th day of December, 1939, and from 
the whole thereof. 
This appeal is taken on both questions of 
law and fact. 
Dated this 29th day of February, 1940. 
STEW ART, STEW ART & PARKINSON 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
Attorneys for Defendant, Covey 
Garage, a corporation 
Filed March 4, 1940. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
STIPULATION 
Comes now the plaintiff by his attorneys and 
hereby stipulates that the filing of a statutory 
cost bond on appeal herein and of a supersedeas 
bond on appeal is hereby waived and that the 
defendant, Covey Garage, a corporation, may pro-
ceed on appeal with like effect as though such 
undertakings were filed in accordance with the 
statute. 
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It is further stipulated that pending final 
disposition of the appeal that execution against 
said defendant may be stayed. 
Dated this 29th day of January, 1940. 
JUDD, RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Filed March 5, 1940. 
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No. 6243 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH 
E. L. ROMNEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
-vs-
COVEY GARAGE, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
AMERICAN EQUITABLE AS-
SURANCE CO:MP ANY, a cor-
poration, 
Interpleaded Defendant 
and Respondent. 
ASSIGNMENTS 
OF ERROR 
Comes now the appellant, Covey Garage, a 
corporation, and upon the record heretofore trans-
mitted to and filed in this court pursuant to the 
appeal herein, assigns the following errors upon 
which it will rely for a reversal of the decision 
and final judgment of the court entered on the 
29th day of December, 1939. 
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I. 
The court erred 1n overruling defendant's 
demurrer to plaintiffs complaint on .. each and 
every ground set forth in said demurrer. (Tr. 8, 
9; Ab.Sf, 
II. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's 
objection to the introduction of any evidence 
raised prior to the introduction of any evidence 
(Tr. 37-38; Ab. 11-12), during the course of the 
trial (Tr. 51, 56; Ab. 20, 22), and prior to final 
submission of the case. (Tr. 81, Ab. 32), and 
which objection was based on the insufficiency of 
plaintiff's complaint. 
III. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's 
motion to strike all the testimony of the witness, 
E. L. Romney, as follows: 
"MR. STEWART: I move at this 
time to strike all of the testimony of this 
witness on the ground that it is ·incompet-
ent, irrelevant and immaterial and not 
within any issue properly raised by the 
pleadings. The pleadings affirmatively 
show that the car was stolen and this testi-
mony in no way tends to establish any 
liability on the part of the defendant. 
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"THE COURT: The motion may be 
denied." (Tr. 51, Ab. 20). 
IV. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's 
motion to strike all of the testimony of the wit-
nesses Remington and Jones, which motion was 
as follows: 
"MR. STEW ART: * * ~-: I move to 
strike all of the testimony of the witnesses 
Remington and Jones on the ground that 
it is not within any issues in the case, that 
it is not within any allegations of negli-
gence and the complaint itself precludes 
the introduction of any evidence of neg-
ligence." (Tr. 81, Ab. 32). 
v. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's 
objection to the examination of the witness, C. B. 
Squires, as follows: 
"MR. STEWART: If your honor 
please, I understand that the plaintiff pro-
poses to prove that some two or three 
months prior to the time that this particu-
lare theft is alleged, that Mr. Squires left 
his car at the garage and that it was not 
there, or he didn't get it when he came 
back for it, or possibly that it was stolen, 
and it is my position that such testimony 
is irrelevant and immaterial; that it would 
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raise a wholly collateral issue that would 
have to be separately tried to determine 
whether or not in the Squires particular 
case that car was stolen under certain cir-
cumstances which might be negligent, and 
that such issue would be so collateral and 
immaterial as to inject into the case a mat-
ter entirely irrelevant, and if your honor 
wishes to take the time at present moment, 
I will be glad to discuss that question of 
law. * * * I make my objection at this 
time to any testimony of this witness rela-
tive to a possible previous theft from the 
defendant garage, any such evidence be-
ing wholly irrelevant and immaterial and 
being an attempt to raise a wholly collat-
eral issue that would have to be fully 
tried in order to determine whether or not 
it might possibly have any bearing upon 
this present case. 
"THE COURT: The objection may 
be overruled." (Tr. 39-40, Ab. 13-14). 
VI. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's 
objection to the examination of the witness, C. 
B. Squires, as follows: 
"Q. What was done in your pres-
ence there with respect to attempting to 
locate your car? 
"A. When I presented the claim check 
I told him the kind of car and the color. 
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"MR. STEWART: We object to that 
as being hearsay and there being no foun-
dation as to whom he told, or whether he 
told it to anybody that would make any 
such statement binding upon the defend-
ant. 
"MR. NEBEKER: He is talking to 
the attendant at the garage. 
"A. And the man in charge, I told 
him that. 
"MR. STEW ART: Then I make the 
further objection that anything that might 
have been said or done by an attendant in 
charge would not be binding upon the de-
fendant. 
"THE COURT: If it is in the nature 
of an admission, of course-
"MR. NEBEKER: No; it won't be in 
the nature of an admission. 
"THE COURT: The objection will 
be overruled. 
"Q. You may state what was done. 
"A. This man in charge took me all 
through the garage in an effort to locate 
· my car, and then he told me I couldn't 
claim it. 
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"MR. STEv\' ART: Just a mmnent. I 
object to anything he may have told him 
while taking him through the garage as 
not in any way binding, or there being no 
foundation to Inake that binding upon the 
defendant corporation. ~~ ~~ ~~ 
"THE COURT: The objection will 
be overruled. You may answer the ques-
tion-continue with your answer. 
"A. (Answer read) I will have to 
correct that. I looked through the garage 
and the car couldn't be located. Then he 
told me the car had been stolen and re-
ferred me to the manager of the garage, 
and told me then that the car had been 
driven out. 
"MR. STEWART: Just a minute. 
Are you talking about the same conversa-
tion? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"MR. STE,VART: 'Vith the same at-
tendant? 
"A. Same attendant and the mana-
ger, that the car had been driven out-
"MR. STEWART: I take it that my 
objection goes to all of this? 
"MR. NEBEKER: Yes. 
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"A. The night before about 11:50 
and that it had not been located; that 
they didn't know where it was; that they 
had reported it to the Police Department 
of Salt Lake City." (Tr. 41, 42, 43; Ab. 
15, 18). 
VII. 
The court erred in denying defendant's mo-
tion to strike all of the testimony of the witness, 
C. B. Squires, which motion was urged at the 
conclusion of the testimony of said witness, as 
follows: 
"MR. STEWART: Now, at this time, 
your honor, we move to strike all of the 
testimony of Mr. Squires concerning an 
alleged taking of his car on the ground 
that such testimony is wholly irrelevant 
and immaterial, and purports to raise a 
wholly collateral, does in fact raise a wholly 
collateral matter; that the testimony does 
not show any, or disclose any facts as to 
an occurrence due to any negligence; it does 
not show a condition, which the defendant 
might or should have remedied in any way; 
it does not indicate any course of conduct, 
or a neglect to remedy any condition, or 
any negligence of any employee which 
would have any bearing or relationship to 
a subsequent theft of an automobile. It is 
unlike the case that counsel referred to 
where the testimony of prior occurrences 
in the mind indicated a negligent condition 
or a condition that was likely in the future 
to cause an accident. 
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·'THE COURT: The motion may be 
denied. ~~ ~~ ~-:" (Tr. ~-k :\b. 18). 
and prior to final submission of the case as fol-
lows: 
,.MR. STE,YART: ~·: ~~ ~~ Particularly 
I move to strike the testimony of Mr. Squires 
on the ground that it is entirely irrelevant 
and immaterial and raises a wholly col-
lateral issue, there not being any evidence 
that would show a similarity of facts estab-
lishing a similarity of theft to that in this 
particular instance." (Tr. 81, Ab. 32). 
VIII. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's 
motion for a non-suit or dismissal at the conclu-
sion of plaintiff's evidence for the reason that 
plaintiff's complaint was insufficient and that 
there was no evidence of any act of negligence on 
the part of defendant, nor evidence of any act 
of negligence on the part of defendant which was 
the proximate cause of the damage to plaintiff's 
automobile. (Tr. 19-A, Ab. 33). 
IX. 
The decision of the court is contrary to and 
against the law in that plaintiff's complaint is 
insufficient, and there is no evidence of any act 
of negligence on the part of defendant, nor evi-
dence of any act of negligence on the part of 
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defendant which was the proximate cause of the 
damage to plaintiff's automobile. (Tr. 25, 26; 
Ab. 43, 44). 
X. 
That the evidence is insufficient to sustain 
the findings of fact numbered three and four, 
in that there is no evidence of any negligence on 
the part of defendant, nor any evidence of any 
negligence on the part of defendant which was 
the proximate cause of the damage to plaintiff's 
automobile. (Tr. 23, Ab. 42). 
XI. 
That the findings of fact are insufficient to 
sustain conclusion of law No. 1. and the judgment, 
in that there is no finding of any specific neg-
ligence on the part of defendant, nor any finding 
of any negligence on the part of defendant which 
was the proximate cause of the damage to plain-
tiff's automobile. (Tr. 25, 26; Ab. 42-44). 
XII. 
The court erred in permitting over defend-
ant's objection plaintiff to amend his complaint 
subsequent to the trial, and after a decision had 
been entered in favor of plaintiff against defend-
ant to ask for the allowance of interest. (Tr. 23, 96; 
Ab. 37-38, 40). 
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XIII. 
The court erred in making its findings of fact 
Nos. 5 and 6 as follows, to-wit: 
"5. That the plaintiff is the real 
party in interest in this proceeding and has 
legal capacity to sue on account of the 
claim alleged in his complaint. 
"6. That American Equitable Assur-
ance Company has no claim against Covey 
Garage resulting from the damage to said 
automobile." (Tr. 23, Ab. 43). 
XIV. 
The court erred in making and entering its 
conclusion of law No. 2, as follows: 
"2. That said judgment provide that 
the American Equitable Assurance Com-
pany has no claim against Covey Garage 
on account of ·the damage to plaintiff's 
automobile." (Tr. 25, Ab. 43). 
XV. 
That the findings of fact are not supported 
by the evidence. (Tr. 24, 25; Ab. 41-43). 
XVI. 
That the judgment is not supported by, and is 
contrary to the evidence. (Tr. 26, Ab. 44). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
58 
XVII. 
That the evidence and findings of fact do not 
support the conclusion of law. (Tr. 25, Ab. 43). 
XVIII. 
That the judgment is not supported by the 
findings of fact. (Tr. 26, Ab. 44). 
XIX. 
That the judgment is contrary to and against 
the law. (Tr. 26, Ab. 44). 
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that the de-
cision and judgment of the District Court herein 
be reversed and that said court be instructed and 
directed to make findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and judgment in accordance with the evi-
dence and the law. 
STEWART, STEWART & PARKINSON 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
Received copy of the foregoing Assignments 
of Error this 5th day of April, 1940. 
JUDD, RAY, QUINNEY, & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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JUDD, RAY QUINNEY, & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for American Equitable 
Assurance Company, a corporation, 
Interpleaded Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Filed ............................................................ , 1940. 
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